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Abstract This study investigates small businesses’ fi-
nancing decisions. Drawing upon asymmetric informa-
tion theory, institutional theory and relevant literature on
cognitive financial constraints, human capital and social
capital, we propose a theoretical framework in which
financing determinants come from three dimensions: en-
trepreneurs’ individual factors, organisational (firm-level)
factors and contextual (institutional) factors. We employ
this model to distinguish four types of firms: (1) firms that
use no external finance, (2) firms that use informal finance
only, (3) firms that use formal finance only and (4) firms
that use both formal and informal finance. An empirical
test on Vietnamese small businesses shows that factors
from all three dimensions are important in understanding
small businesses’ financing decisions.
Keywords Informalfinance .Smallbusiness .Financing
strategy . Entrepreneurial finance . Vietnam
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1 Introduction
In the corporate finance literature, there has been a long
investigation into the decision-making methods used by
corporations in choosing which financing source to use
for their investment projects. As a result, a set of theories
has been developed that includes the pecking-order
theory (Myers 1984) and the static trade-off theory
(Scott 1972). These are of great help in understanding
corporate financial structure. In contrast, the literature
on the financing decisions of small businesses is not as
well developed. Small, non-listed firms, especially those
in the developing countries, are less likely to have
optimal access to bank loans due to the informational
asymmetries associated with their smallness and new-
ness, both of which are well known to be small firm–
specific financial constraints (see Carreira and Silva
(2010) for a review). It is not only formal debt finance
that is largely inaccessible to these firms; equity markets
such as initial public offering (IPO), venture capital and
angel funds are also options that are not open to many
small companies. As such, when the external financing
decisions of small businesses are being analysed, it is
generally done via a strand of research that focuses on
the relationship between formal and informal finances,
with very little research being published on the trade-
offs that are associated with formal versus informal
funding of small businesses (Wu et al. 2016). Casey
and O’Toole (2014) also point out that the literature on
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the relationship between informal credit and bank credit
is not well developed and primarily focuses on house-
holds in rural areas rather than on small businesses.
In this study, informal finance is defined as small,
unsecured and short-in-maturity funding capital sourced
from (1) private moneylender(s), (2) the relatives and
friends of the business owners and (3) other enterprises.
Informal finance is found to be positively associated
with firm growth and performance in several developing
countries, including China, India, Thailand,
Madagascar, Egypt, Nepal and Vietnam (see Kislat
(2015) for a summary). Even though the importance of
informal finance has been widely confirmed, we know
little about the underlying mechanisms that lead to the
decisions to use this funding source. Previous studies
rarely offer an explanation for the decisions of small
business to take out except to state that they are ‘forced’
to do so; banks ration funds to borrowers, and the
informal sector serves those borrowers who are exclud-
ed by the banks (Hoff and Stiglitz 1990). However,
there is a possibility that some businesses self-select
informal finance even when their credit scores are un-
blemished (Fraser 2009). What it is that prompts these
firms to make this ‘irrational’ decision is, unfortunately,
unclear in the extant literature.
More importantly, recent studies report that some
small firms actively decide against taking out external
finance, whether it be formal or informal. Even in the
context of the UK, a well-developed financial hub, 55%
of firms made such a funding decision in 2017 (UK
Department for Business 2019). Although it has long
been recognised that a lack of access to external finance,
be it formal or informal, is negatively associated with
growth and performance (Cheng and Degryse 2010), we
know relatively little about the underlying mechanisms
that lead to the decision to eschew external loans.
Recently, Fraser et al. (2015) pointed out that cognitive
financial constraints, which are a function of entrepre-
neurs’ personal background, may lead to the establish-
ment of conservative behaviours. However, it is unclear
which types of background may lead to cognitive finan-
cial constraints and, hence, the decisions of small busi-
nesses to shun external finance.
This study aims to fill these two particular gaps in the
extant literature by proposing a comprehensive theoret-
ical framework that may provide a better understanding
of the mechanisms underlying small business financing
decisions. Specifically, our endeavour is to distinguish
four groups of firms by their financing decisions: (1)
firms that use no external finance, (2) firms that use
informal finance only, (3) firms that use formal finance
only and (4) firms that use both formal and informal
finance. The key research question that we strive to
answer is: how do firms that make different financing
decisions differ? In other words, what might be the
determinants of firm financing decisions?
Specifically, this study proposes a framework that
incorporates a number of potential determinants from a
variety of dimensions classified by three levels: entre-
preneurs’ individual factors, organisational (firm-level)
factors and contextual (institutional) factors. We draw
upon asymmetric information theory, institutional theo-
ry and a set of relevant literature on cognitive
financial constraints and social capital to underpin
our theoretical model.
The model is then tested using a panel dataset of
more than 15,000 firm-year observations of
Vietnamese small businesses from 2005 to 2015.
Empirical findings show that, at the individual level,
entrepreneurs’ cognitive financial constraints (repre-
sented in this study by ethnicity and gender) and
their individual social capital (networks) are all
important determinants of their ventures’ financing
decisions. At the organisational level, entrepreneur-
ial orientation (represented by exporting and inno-
vation) and organisational social capital (represent-
ed by membership of local industry associations)
may influence firm financing decisions. Finally, at
the contextual level, we find that governance qual-
ity of local government and the existence of pro-
entrepreneurship informal institutions are important
determinants of financing decisions.
This study makes two important contributions to the
extant literature on small business financing behaviour.
First, it expands our understanding of some hitherto
overlooked financing decisions of small businesses,
namely the decisions to pass up on external finance or
to rely on internal finance only. While a large body of
research aims to investigate issues related to the supply
side of the financial market (e.g. small businesses are
side-lined by banks), we suggest that issues that origi-
nate from the demand side may also play an essential
role in firm financing decisions. Rather than following
the conventional assumptions that small firms always
need external finance and that they fail to obtain ade-
quate loans due to market frictions, we propose some
new insights to explain why some firms intentionally
decide against using external finance or choose to rely
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only on informal finance despite being eligible to apply
for bank loans.
The second contribution of this study is that it paints
a comprehensive picture of firm financing decisions
from several relevant perspectives. Standing in sharp
contrast to the conventional studies that focus on firm-
level determinants of (corporate) financing strategy, this
study incorporates entrepreneurs’ individual character-
istics and contextual (institutional) factors into the mod-
el of firm financing decisions. The inclusion of the
individual and contextual dimensions of analysis is par-
ticularly relevant to the context of small businesses,
given that small firms are dependent on their owner-
managed entrepreneurs and are relatively vulnerable to
external institutional environments. As such, this study
proposes that a firm’s financing strategy may depend on
(1) who owns the firm, (2) what assets the firm has and
(3) where it is located.
This study is helpful to policymakers tasked with
designing programs aimed at restructuring financing
sectors, given that we now have more precise knowl-
edge about who are likely to be clients of the formal and
informal sectors, what types of businesses are likely to
use which sources of finance and where informal financ-
ing is more popular.
2 Related literature
2.1 The classification of financing sources
Unlike the literature on the financing of established
corporations, the literature examining financing sources
in the context of small businesses lack a clear and well-
developed theoretical framework. In the corporate fi-
nance literature, financing sources are typically classi-
fied as being internal capital, debts or equity. However,
this is not the case when it comes to analysing small
businesses, where scholars use formal versus informal
classification method of classifying external finance.
In simple terms, formal finance is financing capital
that has been sourced from banks and other formal
financial intermediaries, whereas informal finance is
the capital which has been sourced from friends, family,
relatives or private moneylenders (Elston et al. 2016).
Formal finance lending is processed based on hard
information and arm-length principles while the infor-
mal lending decision is made using soft (private) infor-
mation and relationship-based principles. Given this
difference between the two, entrepreneurs face trade-
offs in deciding on the appropriate source of financing
for their businesses. Wu et al. (2016) suggest that infor-
mal funding and formal funding differ in the provisions
of the financing contracts. Specifically, informal debt
can be attractive to entrepreneurs because of its relative
speed, lower initial transaction fees and freedom from
collateral requirements. While the lower interest rates of
formal bank lending might make it the preferred route,
however, a longer loan processing time might not tally
with the required timeframe.
Within this strand of literature, there are also different
views about the relationship between the two sources.
One view holds that informal finance is the last resort for
those entrepreneurs who are quantity-rationed in the
more desirable formal sector. This rationing may arise
because formal lenders have limited information and
thus rely on collaterals to overcome the moral hazard
and adverse selection that are intrinsic in credit transac-
tions. Firms that fail to provide sufficient collaterals are
automatically screened out and are forced to find infor-
mal lenders, who can substitute their informational ad-
vantages of information-intensive screening and moni-
toring for collaterals (Guirkinger 2008). The informa-
tional advantages of the informal sector (private mon-
eylenders in particular) can substantially reduce trans-
action costs, and this may push the effective cost of
informal loans below the effective cost of formal loans.
However, the price (i.e. the interest rate) offered to
borrowers in the informal sector (private moneylenders
in this case) is typically much higher than the prices seen
in the formal sector. This phenomenon could be ex-
plained by the regional monopolism of the informal
sector or because informal lenders are likely to engage
in strategic cooperation, thus limiting competition
(Floro and Ray 1997).
In contrast to the ‘last resort’ view of informal fi-
nance, some scholars posit that the informal sector may
actually be preferred to the formal sector. Researchers
typically cite funding from family, friends and relatives
as their research subjects’ finance choices (Lee and
Persson 2016). In the initial stage of the venturing
process or in urgent situations, these informal funding
arrangements may act as seeding capital or quick capital
that satisfies entrepreneurs’ capital needs at low cost and
with flexible repayment schedules. Private money-
lenders are also of benefit to entrepreneurs in the sense
that they have greater access to private information,
enabling them to write contracts that are more state-
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contingent than formal contracts and are thus less risky
for borrowers (Boucher and Guirkinger 2007). As such,
entrepreneurs that are reluctant to assume the risk of a
formal contract and are risk-rationed in the formal sector
may also seek informal finance.
Despite the dissimilar viewpoints concerning the re-
lationship between the two sectors, the literature seems
to be in consensus that the formal and informal
financing sectors serve distinct groups of borrowers. In
addition, they apply different sets of behavioural rules
and incentive structures to deal with monitoring and
enforcement problems. As such, Jain (1999) considers
the coexistence of the two sectors as an equilibrium
phenomenon in which entrepreneurs may want to bor-
row from both sectors even in those markets that are
unhampered by failures and distortions.
2.2 The financing of small businesses
Even though the importance of non-bank financing for
small businesses has long been recognised, the extant
research focus is largely steered towards trade credit
(Casey and O’Toole 2014) and the emerging equity
markets such as venture capital and angel funding (see
Cumming and Groh (2018) for the most recent summa-
ry). For most small businesses, their inferior positions in
the business hierarchy and their lack of long and
trackable performance records substantially reduce the
chance of obtaining trade credit from suppliers and
clients. Further, equity financing is an unpopular (and
is probably the least preferred) financing channel for
most entrepreneurs in the developing countries
(Cumming and Groh 2018). In such a situation, informal
loans appear to be one of the most promising sources of
external funding.
The impacts of informal funding on firm perfor-
mance have been well established in the extant litera-
ture. Using China as the context of analysis, Beck et al.
(2015) and Elston et al. (2016) find that the use of
informal finance, especially financing from friends and
family, is positively associated with the sales growth of
Chinese microenterprises. However, in a research on
Brazilian small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Saeed
(2009) shows that a shift from informal to formal bank
finance is associated with improved economic growth
outcomes. To synthesise these contradictory findings,
Wu et al. (2016) propose that firm performance is an
inverted U-shaped function of the level of informal
debts. In other words, a balanced level of formal-
informal loans is indeed beneficial for small businesses,
while being too reliant on informal loans is injurious.
While the impacts of informal loans on firm perfor-
mance are well understood, we know relatively little
about the mechanisms leading firms to using this financ-
ing source. Specifically, it remains largely unknown that
firms with what kinds of characteristics are more likely
to use informal finance. In fact, literature provides some
hints (unsystematic evidence) about the determinants of
entrepreneurs’ formal/informal financing decisions.
Previous studies have shown that social capital is an
important determinant of informal financing decisions
(Chua et al. 2011; Menkhoff et al. 2012), and risk
attitudes and the extent of personal wealth are also found
to have high impact on the process of selecting financ-
ing sources (Elston and Audretsch 2010). However,
these studies have yet been able to distinguish the effects
of individual social capital from the effects of
organisational social capital on firm financing decisions.
Also, entrepreneurs’ characteristics such as risk attitudes
are examined in an isolated manner from their back-
grounds such as gender and ethnics.
Moreover, studies that examine financing decisions
that take into account entrepreneurs’ characteristics typ-
ically ignore the influences of firm-level characteristics
and vice versa. Given that SMEs are small and are
usually perceived as sharing the same identity with their
entrepreneurs (Barton and Matthews 1989), it is impor-
tant to investigate both firm-level and individual-level
determinants of financing decisions. Additionally, re-
gional studies recently highlight the importance of local
institutional settings, including formal and informal in-
stitutions on small businesses’ behaviours and perfor-
mance (Nguyen et al. 2018). It has been shown that local
governance quality (formal institutions) can shape en-
trepreneurs’ incentives and subsequently their strategic
planning and decisions (Su and Bui 2017). Meanwhile,
informal institutions such as values and business norms
are also found to exert non-trivial impacts on local small
businesses’ investment and performance (Stephan et al.
2015).
In general, previous studies provide some initial un-
derstanding of the role of entrepreneurs’ personal char-
acteristics in small businesses’ financing decisions.
However, there is emerging evidence suggesting that
we need to fully incorporate all three levels of analysis:
individual level, firm level and contextual level into a
theoretical framework to precisely understand the deter-
minants of small businesses’ financing decisions,
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including (1) which types of firms are more likely to
borrow external loans and (2) if firms want to borrow,
whether formal or informal finance is more preferred.
3 Theoretical framework and hypotheses
A brief review of the recent literature shows that while
the positive impact on firm performance of external
finance in general and informal finance in particular
has been widely confirmed, less is understood
concerning the drivers of a firm’s financing decision.
We still do not know why some entrepreneurs do not
seek to access any external finance or why some entre-
preneurs will use informal but not formal finance, or
vice versa. In this section, therefore, we strive to build a
model that can provide some insight into the question
‘how do firms with different financing decisions differ?’
To answer this question, we employ the information-
al asymmetry theory and the theory of cognitive finan-
cial constraints, in combination with a set of relevant
literature. We examine the financing decision by first
distinguishing between demand-side factors and supply-
side factors. Then, we argue that the intertwining of the
demand and supply factors is a product of individual
characteristics, firm-level characteristics and the sur-
rounding institutional settings. These three levels of
analysis point to a theoretical framework in which the
financing decision of a small business could be ex-
plained by knowing who runs the business (i.e. the
entrepreneur’s characteristics), what the business looks
like (the firm-level characteristics) and where it is locat-
ed (i.e. the contextual characteristics). Figure 1 illus-
trates our theoretical framework.
3.1 Entrepreneurs’ individual characteristics
3.1.1 Cognitive financial constraints
One of the innovations of this model is that it includes
both the demand and supply sides when analysing firm
financing decisions. The extant literature focuses largely
on the supply side, with common assumptions being
that small businesses always need external finance,
which they cannot obtain because their smallness and
newness create intrinsic informational asymmetries,
thus leading to credit rationing. However, it is not, in
fact, the case that entrepreneurs always need bank loans
(Fraser et al. 2015) and there should therefore be another
explanation for the generally low usage of bank loans
and external finance by small businesses. Hutchinson
(1995) suggests that the low use rate of external finance
could be due to the demand-side’s cognitive financial
constraints rather than the financial constraints generally
accepted to have been imposed by the supply side.
Unlike financial constraints, which are a product of
informational asymmetries and market failures, cogni-
tive financial constraints are experienced when entrepre-
neurs maintain a conservative mindset, high-risk-averse
attitude and low motivation for development (Barton
and Matthews 1989; Fraser et al. 2015).
Following Barton and Gordon (1987) and Matthews
et al. (1994), we argue that entrepreneurs’ personal
background may strongly influence their cognitive re-
sources and ability to support their entrepreneurial ef-
forts. Specifically, we argue that minor ethnics are more
likely to suffer from (demand-side) cognitive financial
constraints. However, we first summarise some key
arguments relating to the well-known issues originating
from the supply side (differential treatments from the
banking industry).
The extant literature has documented a number of
supply-side reasons for ethnic minorities having re-
duced access to finance compared to the ethnic majority.
Chief among these is discrimination. Lenders may dis-
criminate against a certain group of borrowers for vari-
ous reasons. The taste-based theory (Becker 1971) sug-
gests that economic agents are keen to seek transaction
partners who are similar to them, thereby reducing un-
certainties and improving perceived trust. When the
transaction partners (e.g. borrowers) are from other
tribes (e.g. minor ethnicities), the lenders may be ex-
posed to uncertainties, leading to discrimination. Also,
information-based theory (Edmund 1972) argues that
lenders are inclined to believe, based on the information
they collect, that ethnic minorities are less productive,
less capable and less well educated and thus threaten
lenders’ profitability.1 Bertrand et al. (2005) identify
these perceptions as negative implicit attitudes or un-
conscious mental associations towards ethnic
minorities.
Despite these findings, we argue in this study that,
from the demand side, entrepreneurs may intentionally
decide not to use external finance because they suffer
1 Fraser (2009) also names this type of discrimination ‘statistical
discrimination’ (where poorer credit outcomes for ethnic minorities
are due to the groups’ higher average default rate).
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from cognitive financial constraints (i.e. they do not
want to borrow). By way of example, ethnic minorities
are discouraged from seeking external loans because of
their perceived inferior ethnic backgrounds. Fraser
(2009) documents four channels through which ethnic
minorities may suffer from such cognitive financial
constraints. First, ethnic-associated factors (e.g. lack of
financial skills, small-sized businesses and remote loca-
tion of the businesses) lead to higher application costs.
Second, informational asymmetries can be greater be-
tween lenders and ethnic minorities. Language, for ex-
ample, is identified as the key obstacle that discourages
ethnic minorities from applying for bank loans (Nguyen
et al. 2017). Third, borrowing is associated with higher
risk, leading ethnic minorities who are embedded in
their conservative, risk-averse cultures to self-select
out of the loan pool (Baulch et al. 2007). Fourth, in-
formed perceptions of actual ethnic discrimination or
even misperceptions of ethnic discrimination may de-
press borrowing intentions. Further, Bayer et al. (2018)
show that minor-ethnicity borrowers tend to grav-
itate towards high-interest lenders (e.g. informal
financing sources) even when their own credit
scores are relatively unblemished. This self-selected
shopping behaviour is a product of the cognitive finan-
cial constraints that discourage them from applying for
bank loans.
Some empirical studies indicate that the incidences of
discouragement (factors related to the need of using
external loans) are more prevalent than the loan denials
(factors related to the capability of obtaining external
loans).2 For example, controlling for credit score and
other risk factors, Robb (2013) finds that in the USA,
ethnic minority entrepreneurs are less likely than their
white counterparts to apply for loans because they fear
being turned down. As such, there is a growing literature
suggesting that cognitive financial constraints may be a
greater issue for ethnic minorities than even the conven-
tional supply-side lending discrimination (see Carter
et al. (2015) for a review).
Female entrepreneurs may suffer from similar issues
related to cognitive financial constraints. There is a
growing body of literature that empirically demonstrates
that female-run businesses are no different from male-
run businesses in terms of performance, growth and
productivity (Kalnins and Williams 2014; Rietz and
Henrekson 2000). The fact that males and females are
not significantly dissimilar in terms of skills, abilities
and brain functions has been well documented in the
social feminist literature (see Justo et al. (2015) for a
review), as well as in the cognitive neuro-imaging liter-
ature (Fine et al. 2013; Rippon 2016). As such, when
explaining why female-run businesses are typically
smaller and less investment-intensive than those run
by males, scholars employ the stereotype theory. In
brief, because of their socially assigned feminine gender
stereotypes, females are less likely to run large busi-
nesses, are reluctant to seek external finance and tend
not to make optimal investments given their available
business opportunities (Bardasi et al. 2011). There is a
set of social roles associated with feminine stereotypes,
such as the perceptions that they are weaker than their
masculine counterparts, hold inferior social positions
and follow informed constraints pre-set by social stan-
dards (Lee and Marvel 2014). These self-deflating atti-
tudes and beliefs inevitably trigger the establishment of
cognitive financial constraints. As such, it is reasonable
to expect that female entrepreneurs are less likely to seek
external finance.
2 See, for example, Blanchflower et al. (2003), Fraser (2009) and Robb
(2013).
Individual factors: 
Cognitive financial constraints
Individual social capital
Organisational factors: 
Entrepreneurial orientation
Organisational social capital
Contextual factors: 
Local governance quality
Pro-entrepreneurship culture
Financing decisions:
No external vs external financing
Informal vs formal financing
Fig. 1 Theoretical framework
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In sum, firms run by entrepreneurs suffered from
cognitive financial constraints may have a lower need
of using external finance and also possess a lower level
of capability of obtaining external finance (i.e. differen-
tial treatments from the banking industry). As such, we
propose that
Hypothesis H1a: Individuals with cognitive finan-
cial constraints originating from their background
characteristics (i.e. minor ethnicities, females) are
less likely to use external finance.
Further, in the rare cases where external finance is
required, it is expected that informal financing sources
are probably to be preferred given that they are associ-
ated with lower risk, and are easier to access by minor
ethnicities and females in comparison to formal finance.
In other words, entrepreneurs with cognitive financial
constraints, due to their cognitive biases, have a lower
need of formal finance, and given their inferior charac-
teristics, they also have a lower level of capability of
obtaining formal finance. As such, we have
Hypothesis H1b: When entrepreneurs with cogni-
tive financial constraints use external finance, they
are more likely to employ informal financing
sources than formal financing sources.
3.1.2 Individual social capital
Social capital is highly related to the capability of seek-
ing external finance and also to the sources of financing
(formal vs. informal).
Social capital is defined as the structure of infor-
mal social relationships conducive to devel-
oping cooperation among economic actors
aimed at increasing social product, which is
expected to accrue to the group of people
embedded in those social relationships
(Hayami 2009, p. 98).
This definition of social capital implies the role of
social relationships forged through informal organisa-
tions, which could be horizontal (e.g. sports clubs) or
hierarchical (e.g. family members). These relations are
informal in the sense that they are not enforced by the
state’s coercive power.
It is noteworthy that social networks are typically
classified as having either strong or weak ties. The
strong/weak social ties are relations with high/low levels
of emotional attachment. While family ties are ‘strong
ties’, business and government ties are ‘weak ties’
(Putnam 1993). The role of family funding is found to
be important to nascent entrepreneurs and small busi-
nesses (Lee and Persson 2016). Strong-ties funding is
relatively accessible, partly because of the involvement
of kinship/friendship emotions. However, as firms ma-
ture, relationships with weak ties become more and
more important. Granovetter (1973) emphasises the
‘strength of weak ties’ and argues that weak ties are less
reliable but more likely to provide access to a larger pool
of potential funding. Regardless of the strength associ-
ated with social ties, scholars seem to agree that social
networks, in general, are essential to accessing external
finance.
In this study, we argue that the social networks
associated with an entrepreneur derive from two
sources, namely the entrepreneur’s previous venturing
activities and the current venture. Specifically,
Kirschenhofer and Lechner (2012) argue that more ex-
perienced habitual entrepreneurs are more likely to pos-
sess the capability of attracting funding through direct
social ties. The more experience an entrepreneur
has, the stronger and more widely spread will be
the associated network ties. As a consequence,
experienced serial entrepreneurs should have ad-
vantages in terms of resource attraction. Their previous-
ly built-up networks mean that they not only possess
better skills in searching for external capital but can also
conduct the search in a larger pool of potential funding
sources (Westhead and Wright 1998). In other words,
they are more capable in searching and securing external
funding sources.
Also, social networks newly established in the cur-
rent ventures also play a key role in determining firm
financing decisions. Menkhoff et al. (2012) investigate
the financing of Thai SMEs and suggest that most loans
do not involve tangible assets as collateral. Instead,
lenders enforce collateral-free loans through third-party
guarantees and relationship lending. Du et al. (2015)
further argue that entrepreneurs must use their social
capital, including relationships built upon political net-
works associated with local authorities, or business net-
works associated with businesspeople, and financial
networks associated with bankers to seek survival and
growth for their newly established ventures.
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It is therefore to be expected that the social capital
associated with an entrepreneur will facilitate his/her
venture’s capability of successfully gaining access to
external finance. As such, we have
Hypothesis H2a: Individuals with more social cap-
ital (habitual entrepreneurs or individuals with
wider networks) are more likely to use external
finance.
In terms of the financing sources, an increase in
entrepreneurial engagement or an expansion in the
scope of social ties is expected to be associated with
higher usage of informal finance. The reason being that
personal social capital embedded in previous start-ups
and current social networks is able to facilitate the flow
of private information (Agarwal and Hauswald 2010),
boosts the level of trust and bridges potential opportu-
nistic behaviours in lending transactions (Anderson and
Nyborg 2011). Thus, we propose
Hypothesis H2b: When entrepreneurs with more
social capital use external finance, they are more
likely to employ informal financing sources than
formal financing sources.
3.2 Firm-level characteristics
3.2.1 Entrepreneurial orientation
Firm financing decisions may also be a function of
organisational factors such as entrepreneurial orienta-
tion (EO). EO is a strategy-making process that provides
organisations with a basis for making entrepreneur-
ial decisions and actions. It refers to a firm’s
strategic organisational posture, capturing specific
entrepreneurial aspects of decision-making styles,
methods and behaviour (Lomberg et al. 2017).
Conventionally, EO encompasses three non-mutu-
ally exclusive dimensions, namely innovativeness,
proactiveness and risk-taking. It is well document-
ed that EO firms perform better than non-EO firms
(see Anderson et al. (2015) for a review).
However, the extant literature makes little mention of
the financing decisions of these two types of firms. Do
EO firms need more external finance than non-EO
firms? If this is the case, which source, formal or infor-
mal finance, is preferred by EO firms?
To answer these questions, we quantify EO using
two indicators, namely innovation and export.
Innovative firms (i.e. firms that introduce new products
or employ new production process) and exporting firms
satisfy the three dimensions of EO, which are innova-
tiveness, proactiveness and risk-taking. It is noteworthy
that EO firms—innovative and/or exporting firms—do
not only demand a higher level of external finance to
support their EO activities but also are more capable in
obtaining external loans, thanks to their activeness in
business activities. Riding et al. (2012) suggest that
small exporter firms are especially likely to seek exter-
nal financing but less likely to obtain formal finance.
The reason is that commercial lenders are less likely to
approve loan applications from young, growth-oriented
SME exporters because they perceive these firms’ op-
erations to be riskier than those of domestically oriented
SMEs. Similarly, innovation-oriented small firms
also operate under financially constrained situa-
tions (Zhu et al. 2012). One explanation for this
is that, from the supply-side viewpoint, innovative-
ness combined with smallness and newness is as-
sociated with uncertainty and a higher default risk,
which substantially reduces formal lenders’ enthu-
siasm (Love and Roper 2015). Another explanation
from the demand side is the entrepreneurs’ reluc-
tance to fully communicate their innovativeness to
banks which, although a strategic decision to pro-
tect their competitive advantages from being imi-
tated, creates additional informational asymmetry
that inevitably reduces their access to formal loans
(Guariglia and Liu 2014).
Building on previous studies, we suggest that EO
firms are keen to seek external finance because they
demand a higher level of capital and also are more
capable of doing so. However, given the difficulties of
and unwillingness to obtain formal finance, we expect
that firms with an entrepreneurial orientation are more
likely (than their non-EO counterparts) to use informal
finance to fund their entrepreneurial projects. Put for-
mally, we have
Hypothesis H3a: Entrepreneurially oriented
(exported or innovative) firms are more likely to
use external finance.
Hypothesis H3b: When entrepreneurially oriented
firms use external finance, they are more likely to
employ informal financing sources than formal
financing sources.
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3.2.2 Organisational social capital
Organisational social capital could also be a crucial
determinant of firm financing decisions. Unlike person-
al social capital, which is embedded in entrepreneurs’
individual networks, organisational capital is associated
with the business itself. For example, local indus-
try associations are important business networks
that offer small businesses access to external re-
sources such as information, business opportuni-
ties, collaboration opportunities and even informal
finance such as trade credits from other members
(Oparaocha 2015). Organisational social capital is
particularly beneficial to resource-constrained firms
(e.g. small businesses) because it provides them
with the opportunity of using resources without
having to acquire ownership of them (Johanson
and Mattsson 2015).
Further, joining local industry associations could be
considered to be a strategic decision for small businesses
wishing to legitimise their existence in the local markets.
In the context of Vietnam, this action is done with the
purpose of establishing stronger connections with local
officials and the state-owned commercial banks
(Nguyen 2019). Given that the formal institutions in
developing countries are insufficiently strong to protect
banks in lending transactions, banks typically employ
off-balance-sheet scrutiny methods to check a bor-
rower’s credibility (Nguyen et al. 2006). Being a
member of industry associations may signal a
business’s legitimised position in its local market,
thereby reducing lenders’ concerns about informa-
tional asymmetries. As such, it is expected that
firms holding memberships in their local industry
associations have a stronger capability of gaining
access to formal loans. It is noteworthy that hold-
ing a membership in local industry associations
may not facilitate the flow of private information,
thereby exerting little impact on firm access to
informal finance. In short, we have
Hypo t h e s i s H4a : F i rm s ha v i n g mo r e
organisational social capital (holding local indus-
try association memberships) are more likely to use
external finance.
Hypothesis H4b: When firms having more
organisational social capital use external finance,
they are more likely to employ formal financing
sources than informal financing sources.
3.3 Contextual characteristics
3.3.1 Local governance quality
Also of interest are the institutional settings em-
bedded in local regions that may affect firm fi-
nancing decisions. The local institutional arrange-
ment (i.e. the governance quality of local govern-
ment) is now well known to be an important
determinant of small business performance, partic-
ularly in developing countries (Nguyen et al.
2018). The reason is that firms located in regions
endowed with a better quality of governance enjoy
a lower level of transaction costs and a higher
level of generalised trust. These regional charac-
teristics have noted benefits for business transac-
tions and collaboration, and hence economic
growth (Baumol and Strom 2007).
However, it is unclear how local governance may
affect firm financing decisions.Wu et al. (2016) conduct
an initial investigation on this issue. They find evidence
for the hypothesis that in a developed institutional
environment, the informal financial markets are
pushed to operate transparently so as to establish
their legitimacy. This is because strong institution-
al settings tend to have strict regulatory and su-
pervisory policies with respect to minimum capital
requirements, the ceilings on unsecured loans, in-
terest rate ceilings and the method of resolving
unpaid loans (Rahman and Luo 2011; Satta
2004). There is scant empirical evidence on the
relationship between local governance and firm
financing decisions, and so we follow Wu et al.
(2016) in suggesting that firms in regions with
better governance quality are more likely to use
external finance, especially informal finance.
In short, firms in stronger governance environ-
ments may raise their demand for external capital
thanks to the reduced transaction costs. Also, they
are more likely to opt for informal financing
sources. Thus, we have
Hypothesis H5a: Firms located in regions with
better governance quality by local governments
are more likely to use external finance.
Hypothesis H5b: When firms located in regions
with better governance quality use external fi-
nance, they are more likely to employ informal
financing sources than formal financing sources.
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3.3.2 Informal institutions
The institutional settings embedded in local regions are
more than just local governance arrangements. They
also include the informal ‘rules of the game’ such as
shared values, norms and beliefs (Williamson 2000).
These factors may strongly shape the choice of financ-
ing source. In the case of Vietnam, informal institutions
(the norms and values of doing business) can be exam-
ined via a specific historical event. While the economic
system in North Vietnam followed the pure socialist
blueprint from the outset, South Vietnam was only
transformed from capitalism in 1975 (Wheeler 2015).
This political separation gives rise to significant differ-
ences in the entrepreneurial norms, values and beliefs
between the two regions (Makino and Tsang 2011).
Moreover, these informal institutions, just as can be seen
in East andWest Germany (Fritsch andWyrwich 2014),
are expected to persist irrespective that the two states
were unified four decades ago and established a com-
mon framework of formal institutions throughout the
whole country.
Given that entrepreneurs in the South were once
exposed to capitalism, which is associated with pro-
entrepreneurial values, they may be less risk-averse
and more growth-oriented than entrepreneurs in the
North, whose shared values are those of socialism,
common ownership and interdependence (Dell et al.
2018). These institutional differences set the foundation
for our expectation that entrepreneurs in the South are
more likely to take on external finance to fund their
investment projects. In contrast, entrepreneurs in the
North are more likely to be constrained within their
available internal capital and would probably opt to give
up growth opportunities rather than actively take on
external debts. Given the differences in the informal
institutions (i.e. the entrepreneurship values) between
the two regions, we expect that
Hypothesis H6a: Firms located in regions with
pro-entrepreneurship informal institutions (South
Vietnam) are more likely to use external finance.
In terms of financing sources, it is expected that
formal finance is preferred to informal financing sources
for two reasons. First, pro-entrepreneurship values and
norms are typically associated with arm-length princi-
ples in doing business, including financial transactions
(Nguyen et al. 2018). This boosts the tendency of using
formal finance in local business communities. Second,
pro-entrepreneurship institutions highlight the values of
individualism (in contrast to communalism widespread
in the North Vietnam) (Dell et al. 2018). The lack of
communal collective action norms particularly reduces
the activeness of local informal financial lenders in the
South Vietnam. As such, firms will need to rely more on
formal finance. Therefore, we propose that
Hypothesis H6b: When firms located in regions
with pro-entrepreneurship informal institutions
use external finance, they are more likely to employ
formal financing sources than informal financing
sources.
A summary of the key arguments on each of the
hypothesis is presented in Appendix Tables 4 and 5.
4 Data and methodology
4.1 Data
To explore the importance of entrepreneurs’ individual
characteristics, firms’ organisational characteristics and
the local contextual environments on small businesses’
financing strategy, this study employs the SME dataset
published by the Central Institute for Economic
Management (CIEM) of Vietnam. This dataset is a
collaboration of CIEM with two other institutions,
namely the Institute of Labour Science and Social
Affairs (ILSSA) of Vietnam and the Development
Economics Research Group (DERG) of Copenhagen
University.
The SME survey has information on several opera-
tional aspects of small ventures (mostly household busi-
nesses) in Vietnam, including their production, sales
structure, investment and employment. Besides covering
venture information, the household characteristics of the
owner-managers and their social network information are
extensively surveyed. The first investigation was con-
ducted in 2005, and since then, it has been carried out
every 2 years. Approximately 2500 small businesses in
10 provinces across Vietnam are randomly selected to
participate in the project. In this study, the authors em-
ploy the dataset over an 11-year period, from 2005 to
2015 (6 surveys in total). In cleaning the data, firms with
no identification code and unmeaningful accounting in-
formation were dropped. Moreover, the outliers are
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controlled for by censoring the top and bottom 1% of
observations in each variable, leaving a final sample of
15,809 firm-year observations in the regression.
4.2 Variables and summary statistics
4.2.1 Dependent variables
The primary dependent variable is a set of firm financ-
ing decisions. We identify four mutually exclusive fi-
nancing strategies using the following two questions in
the survey: ‘Has your firm borrowed from banks or
other formal credit institutions since the last survey?’
and ‘Has your firm borrowed from informal sources
including private moneylenders, relatives and friends
to owners, and other enterprises since the last survey?’
Firms that answer ‘no’ to both questions are coded 0,
firms that use informal finance only are coded 1, firms
that use formal finance only are coded 2 and firms that
answer ‘yes’ to both questions are coded 3. As such, we
have a categorical dependent variable with four poten-
tial outcomes. It is noteworthy that these four outcomes
are mutually exclusive.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for each
category and the total sample. The mean statistics show
that more than a third of the sampled firms use no
external finance and another third use informal finance
only. These statistics are consistent with previous find-
ings (Nguyen 2019) that indicate that Vietnamese SMEs
have limited access to bank loans. The t test also reveals
that there is a significant difference in most characteris-
tics between firms that use no external finance and firms
that use no external finance (except for owner gender).
Also, firms that use formal finance are largely different
from firms that use informal finance, except from some
characteristics of owner age, social networks and infor-
mal institutions (South variable).
4.2.2 Independent variables
As an exploratory study, we propose a set of variables
that we expect to influence firm financing decisions.
The variables are at three distinct levels: individual,
organisational and contextual. According to the theoret-
ical framework, the important determinants at the indi-
vidual level are the entrepreneur’s cognitive financial
constraints and social capital. We measure the degrees
of cognitive financial constraints using two variables:
the owner’s ethnic background and gender. These
individual-specific factors play an essential role in guid-
ing individuals’ selection of cognitive patterns because
they indicate the knowledge and experience of entrepre-
neurs, which may markedly influence their cognitive
resources (Robert and Michael 2006). Specifically, eth-
nic is a categorical variable, which takes value 0 if an
entrepreneur is Kinh ethnic (the major ethnic group in
Vietnam), value 1 for Hoa ethnic (Chinese migrants—
the second largest ethnic grouping) and value 2 for other
minor ethnics. Owner gender is a dummy variable that
takes value 0 for female and value 1 for male.
To measure social capital obtained from previous
venturing experience, we use a start-up experience var-
iable, which takes value 0 if the current business is the
first venture and value 1 if it is not. In terms of social
capital gained from the current venture, we count the
number of people that an entrepreneur currently has
regular contact with in the following four areas: (1)
business people in the same sector; (2) business people
in other sectors; (3) bank officials, including both formal
and informal creditors; and (4) politicians and civil
servants.3 Thus, social network is a count variable indi-
cating the scope of social networking carried out by an
entrepreneur.
From Table 1, we can observe some interesting pat-
terns in the individual characteristics of the four groups
of firms. In the formal group (firms that use formal
finance only), the proportion of males is 67%, so higher
than the other groups. In addition, it is also observed that
entrepreneurs with wider social networks have recourse
to both sources of financing and that entrepreneurs with
higher personal wealth seem to opt for formal loans.
These patterns set up an initial picture of the association
between an entrepreneur’s personal background and the
firm’s financing decisions.
The second level of analysis concerns organisational
characteristics. There are two dimensions proposed in
the theoretical framework: entrepreneurial orientation
and organisational social capital. In terms of entrepre-
neurial orientation, we use two variables: export and
innovation. Export is a dummy variable that takes value
1 if firms have exported since the last survey and value 0
if they have not. Innovation is positioned as a dummy
variable, taking value 1 if firms introduced new products
or improved their current offering or changed their
3 The survey identifies regular contacts as ‘people that you contact at
least once every three months whom you find useful for your business
operations.’
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production process and value 0 if firms did not make
any of these innovations over the last 2 years (i.e. since
the last survey). Finally, we gauge organisational social
capital using an association variable, which is a dummy
with value 1 if firms are members of at least one local
industry association and value 0 if they are not. As
shown in Table 1, firms that export, innovate or hold
memberships in local industry associations do use ex-
ternal finance, especially the formal source.
The third level in the theoretical model concerns
contextual factors, including local governance quality
and informal institutions. To measure local governance
quality (i.e. law enforcement efficiency at the local
level), we use the Provincial Competitiveness Index
(PCI).4 This dataset indicates the governance quality
of a panel of 63 provinces. The quality is scored from
0 to 100, with higher scores reflecting better governance
quality. Finally, to capture the differences in informal
institutions (entrepreneurial values and norms of
doing businesses), we created a South dummy
variable, which takes value 0 if firms are located
in North Vietnam (historically purely socialist) and
value 1 if firms are located in South Vietnam
(exposed to capitalism pre-1975).
The statistics show that firms operating in provinces
with better governance quality (a higher PCI score) or
are more entrepreneurship-friendly (i.e. based in South
Vietnam) either do not use external finance or use
informal debts only. A summary of the variable defini-
tions is presented in Appendix Table 6.
4.2.3 Control variables
To be consistent with the previous studies, we include a
set of covariates that jointly determine firm financing
decisions. At the individual level, we control for owner
age, which is a count variable indicating entrepreneurs’
age. Younger entrepreneurs are more willing to take
4 Provincial Competitiveness Index (CPI) is a joint product of Vietnam
Chamber of Commerce (VCCI) and the US Agency for International
Development (USAID). The PCI index is calculated based on a survey
of more than 17,000 domestic firms and 1700 foreign firms across
provinces in Vietnam. The pilot study was conducted in 2005 on one-
third of the total provinces of Vietnam (63 provinces in total). From
2006, the PCI index is available for all provinces and is updated
annually. For more information: http://eng.pcivietnam.org/
Table 1 Mean summary statistics
No external Informal Formal Both Total t test no external
vs. external
t test formal vs. informal
Observations 5287 5241 1926 3355 15,809
Percentage 33.44 33.15 12.18 21.23 100
Ethnic 1.095 1.078 1.039 1.029 1.069 0.000 0.000
Owner gender 0.632 0.644 0.672 0.629 0.640 0.115 0.033
Owner age 47.063 45.486 45.045 43.874 45.649 0.000 0.108
Start-up experience 0.019 0.023 0.038 0.034 0.026 0.000 0.000
Social network 29.217 32.485 32.541 38.197 32.522 0.000 0.943
Personal wealth 2.311 2.345 2.576 2.613 2.415 0.000 0.000
Firm size 10.483 12.819 27.454 33.352 17.952 0.000 0.000
Asset structure 0.020 0.117 0.293 0.278 0.138 0.000 0.000
Export 0.037 0.047 0.096 0.110 0.062 0.000 0.000
Innovation 0.307 0.344 0.489 0.475 0.375 0.000 0.000
Association 0.257 0.138 0.424 0.233 0.234 0.000 0.000
Distance 87.753 112.981 102.834 107.097 101.866 0.000 0.009
Local governance quality 58.262 58.186 57.043 57.878 58.011 0.000 0.000
South 0.482 0.412 0.417 0.364 0.427 0.000 0.711
The statistics are provided for 15,809 firm-year observations from 2005 to 2015. The t test no external vs. external reports the p value of the t
test between the group of firms that use no external finance and the group of all other firms. The t test formal vs. informal reports the p value
of the t test between the group of firms that use informal finance and the group of firms that use formal finance. The data source is the SME
dataset published by the Central Institute for EconomicManagement (CIEM) of Vietnam. Local governance quality dataset is obtained from
the Province Competitiveness Index (PCI) of Vietnam
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risks than are their older counterparts (Sepulveda and
Bonilla 2014). The reason for this is that older entrepre-
neurs have gained experience that leads them to be more
cautious and less over-optimistic and inclines them to
make decisions associated with a lower and stable risk;
one such decision would be to eschew external finance in
favour of making investments limited to the availability
of internal funds. Also, we control for individuals’wealth
using the survey question ‘by how much do you estimate
that your total household real income has changed since
the last survey’. This item allows us to construct the
personal wealth variable, which comprises six catego-
ries: (1) declined, (2) unchanged, (3) increased no more
than 25%, (4) increased by 25–50%, (5) increased by 50–
100% and (6) increased by more than 100%. Elston and
Audretsch (2010) find that higher levels of owner wealth
have a positive impact on the probability of obtaining
loan financing for businesses thanks to the collateral
effects. However, entrepreneurs with deep pockets may
find external finance avoidable since they can fund their
investments internally. As such, personal wealth may be
associated with firm financing decisions in both positive
and negative directions.
At the firm level, we measure the degrees of infor-
mational asymmetries using firm size variable, which is
a natural log of the number of employees and asset
structure, which is a ratio of fixed assets over total assets
and is a proxy for the availability of collaterals. It is now
well known that large firms are more likely than small
firms to use bank loans (see Carreira and Silva (2010)
for a review), and that firms with a greater number of
fixed assets are more likely to be able to obtain bank
loans (Du et al. 2015). Firm size (whether assessed in
terms of revenues, total assets or the number of em-
ployees) and firm collaterals (fixed assets) serve as
essential informational asymmetry reducers that can
substantially moderate lenders’ concerns about adverse
selection and moral hazard. Table 1 shows that larger
firms use both sources of financing while firms with
collateral seem to opt for formal sources.
Finally, at the contextual level, to gauge the effects of
geographical location on financing decisions, we use a
distance variable, which specifies the distance from a
province to the closest municipal cities (business and
political centres). Yeung et al. (2017) evidently show
that geographical exclusion (whereby bank loans are
inaccessible due to branch closures) and condition ex-
clusion (restrictive conditions attached to bank loans)
may give rise to the proliferation of informal debt.
4.3 Specification and estimation
As the supply and demand factors simultaneously de-
termine a firm’s financing strategy, we follow the liter-
ature on firm financing decisions in proposing the fol-
lowing reduced-form equation:
Financing decisionsigt ¼ β0 þ β1 Individual factorsigt
 
þβ2 Organisational factorsigt
 
þβ3 Contextual factorsigt
 
ð1Þ
vt þ v j þ vi þ μit ð2Þ
where i denotes an individual business, g is the province
and t is a year. Thus, (Financing decisionsigt) is one of
the four observed financing outcomes of firm i in prov-
ince g in year t. The term (Individual factorsigt) is a
matrix of the entrepreneur’s ethnicity, gender, age,
start-up experience, social capital and personal wealth.
Next, the term (Organisational factorsigt) is a matrix of
firm-level characteristics, such as firm size, asset struc-
ture (collaterals), export, innovation and association
memberships. The term (Contextual factorsigt) is a ma-
trix of three variables: distance; governance quality of
local governments and South (a proxy for pro-
entrepreneurship culture).
The financing function also includes a time-specific
component (vt), accounting for macro-business-cycle
effects, and an industry-specific component (vj), which
accounts for industry-specific business-cycle effects.
These effects are controlled by the corresponding dum-
my variables. Firm-specific time-invariant characteris-
tics are captured by vi. This study controls for the
unobserved heterogeneity of the dataset by estimating
the equation using fixed-effects logit and multinomial
logit technique. The fixed-effects logit and multinomial
logit estimator allow us to examine the determinants of
within-subject variability in the model of categorical
dependent variables (Pforr 2014). Finally, μit is the
idiosyncratic component of the error.
Our estimation strategy is as follows: First, we em-
ploy fixed-effects logit to distinguish firms that use
external finance from firms that do not use external
finance. We then employ the multinomial logit to com-
pare firms using no external finance to firms that (1) use
informal finance only, (2) use formal finance only and
(3) use both formal and informal financing sources.
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Second, we employ fixed-effects logit to distinguish
firms that use formal finance only from firms that use
informal finance only. We then employ the multinomial
logit to compare firms using informal finance only to
firms that (1) use no external finance, (2) use formal
finance only and (3) use both formal and informal
financing sources.
5 Results
Table 2 presents the empirical results. Column 1 reports
the fixed-effects logit regression results of external fi-
nancing (including firms that use either informal fi-
nance, formal finance or both sources) versus non-
external financing—the benchmark. Columns 2–4 re-
port the multinomial logit regression results with the
unexposed group being the group of firms that use no
external finance. Column 5 reports the fixed-effects
logit regression results of two specific subsets of the
sample, namely firms that use informal finance only—
the benchmark–and firms that use only formal finance.
Then, columns 6–8 report the multinomial logit regres-
sion results with the unexposed group being the group
of firms that use informal finance. To facilitate the
interpretation of the results, we report the relative-risk
ratios and the odds ratios rather than the regression
coefficients.5
5.1 Entrepreneurs’ individual factors
The odds ratio associated with Hoa ethnic (Chinese
migrants) in column 1 is smaller than 1 and statistically
significant, indicating that entrepreneurs in this ethnic
group are less likely to use external loans. Also, the odds
ratio in column 5 is smaller than 1 and statistically
significant. This indicates that where external finance
is required, informal loans are preferred. This finding is
in line with Nguyen-Viet and Imai (2018), who show
that Chinese immigrants are a closely connected com-
munity. Indeed, compared to the Kinh ethnic group (the
major group), Hoa ethnics (Chinese migrants) are ap-
proximately 50% more likely to use informal finance.
Interestingly, we find no significant differences between
Kinh ethnic and other minor ethnics.
Meanwhile, the odds ratio associated with the
owner’s gender in column 1 is greater than 1 and sig-
nificant, signifying that male entrepreneurs are more
likely to successfully gain access to external debts than
their female counterparts. Specifically, male entrepre-
neurs are 10.2% more likely to seek external finance
than their female peers, ceteris paribus. This finding is
consistent with the literature on the gender gap which
shows that females suffer from substantially higher so-
cial discrimination and difficulties when doing male-
dominated jobs (e.g. entrepreneurship) (Joshi et al.
2015).
In general, the regression results show that an indi-
vidual’s ethnic background and gender may determine
the financing decisions of his/her venture. Specifically,
Hoa ethnic and female entrepreneurs are less likely to
employ external finance. Also, where external finance is
required, Hoa ethnic entrepreneurs are more likely to
employ informal financing sources. As such, hypothesis
H1a is supported to some extent (the risk ratios associ-
ated with minor ethnic in columns 1 and 5 are not
significant) and hypothesis H1b is supported to some
extent (the risk ratio associated with owner gender in
column 5 is not significant).
Next, the risk ratio associated with start-up experi-
ence is greater than 1 and statistically significant in
column 1, indicating that networks established in previ-
ous start-ups serve as useful facilitators to external
debts. This social capital argument is re-confirmed by
the significance of the social network variable in column
1. In general, the empirical findings suggest that social
capital is relevant to gaining access to external finance.
As such, hypothesis H2a is supported. It is also note-
worthy that the effect of start-up experience (31%) is
economically larger than the effect of social network
participation (0.3%). However, we find no evidence
showing that personal social capital influences the use
of formal versus informal finance (the coefficients asso-
ciated with start-up experience and social networks are
insignificant in column 5). Therefore, hypothesis H2b is
not supported.
5.2 Organisational factors
Turning to entrepreneurial orientation variables, while
innovative firms (firms that introduce new products or
deploy new production techniques) are more likely to
use external debts, firms that export seem to opt for
internal finance (being 30% less likely to seek external
5 In epidemiology, the risk ratio or relative risk is the ratio of the
probability of an outcome in an exposed group to the probability of
an outcome in an unexposed group.
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finance than non-exporting firms). As such, hypothesis
H3a is partially supported. This finding differs some-
what from our initial expectation that entrepreneurially
oriented firms are regarded as riskier and are thus more
likely to be financially constrained. The fact that inno-
vative firms are 21.6% more likely to use external debts
than non-innovative firms is a signal that firms with
profitable business opportunities somehow successfully
manage to obtain external funding for their investment
projects. From the demand-side viewpoint, one expla-
nation for this finding is probably that entrepreneurs are
willing to reveal sensitive project information to lenders
in an effort to reduce informational asymmetries if this is
the only way of obtaining credit. From the supply-side
viewpoint, despite suggestions to the contrary in the
literature, lenders may not consider innovativeness to
be a portent of risk and uncertainty. Indeed, lenders may
view innovativeness as a potential channel for growth
and thus see it as likely to secure borrowers’ payment
ability (Cleary et al. 2007).
Meanwhile, the odds ratios associated with export
and innovation are insignificant in column 5. As such,
hypothesis H3b is not supported.
The last dimension of organisational characteristics is
industry association (organisational social capital). The
odds ratio associated with the variable in column 1 is
insignificant. As such, hypothesis H4a is not supported.
However, the odds ratio associated with association
variable in column 5 is statistically significant and great-
er than 1. Specifically, firms holding memberships in
local industry associations are 66.2%more likely to seek
formal finance. This finding thus supports the view that
small businesses and new ventures are keen to leverage
their memberships of industrial and political associa-
tions to gain access to scarce resources, such as bank
loans (Zhou 2013). As such, hypothesis H4b is
supported.
5.3 Contextual factors
Turning to the contextual determinants, the risk ratio
associated with local governance quality in column 1 is
greater than 1 and statistically significant. This result
indicates that firms located in regions with strong gov-
ernance quality are 2.6% more likely to seek external
finance. As such, hypothesis H5a is supported. Also, the
risk ratio associated with the variable in column 5 is
smaller than 1 and statistically significant, indicating
that informal finance is more preferred in regions with
strong governance quality. Therefore, hypothesis H5b is
supported as well.
What surprises us is that the risk ratios associated
with the South variable are smaller than one and statis-
tically significant in column 1, indicating that firms in
South Vietnam are almost 40% less likely to use exter-
nal finance than are firms in North Vietnam. As such,
hypothesis H6a is not supported. This finding, however,
may reveal that informal institutions in the North may
not be sufficiently friendly to entrepreneurship (e.g.
there may be corruption practices) to persuade entrepre-
neurs that their private property is protected from appro-
priations (Nguyen 2019). Insecure property right pro-
tection thus reduces entrepreneurs’ trust in government,
leading to a situation whereby entrepreneurs are keen to
make investments using external financing sources
while redirecting their personal wealth to other safer
channels (Cull and Xu 2005). As such, the low use rate
of external finance in the South may indicate that entre-
preneurs are more willing to reinvest their retained
earnings than are their counterparts in the North, who
may be keen to rely on non-equity finance to make
investments.
Finally, the risk ratio associated with the South var-
iable in column 5 is greater than 1 and statistically
significant. This result indicates that when external fi-
nance is required, firms in the South are 35.9% more
likely to seek formal finance than firms in the North.
The finding implies that entrepreneurs in the South may
prefer arm-length transactions instead of relationship-
based transactions as in the North. Therefore, hypothesis
H6b is supported.
The multinomial logit regression results presented in
columns 2–4 and 6–8 are consistent with our key argu-
ments and, in general, support the hypotheses. The
results show that there is no substantial difference
among the firms that use both formal and informal
financing sources and the firms that use either one of
the two sources. However, there are marked distinctions
between firms that use no external finance and firms that
do use external finance. Table 3 summarises the hypoth-
eses in terms of their supported/unsupported empirical
evidence.
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5.4 Covariates
In terms of the control variables, the risk ratios associ-
ated with owner age are slightly smaller than 1 and
significant in columns 1 and 5, indicating that older
entrepreneurs are more risk-averse in the sense that they
are less likely to seek external loans than are younger
entrepreneurs. In particular, being 1 year older is asso-
ciated with a decrease in the use of external finance of
approximately 2%, and this is for both internal and
external sources. This is aligned with previous findings
that show that younger entrepreneurs are more optimis-
tic and risk-tolerant than their older counterparts
(Ulvenblad et al. 2013).
In contrast, the risk ratio associated with personal
wealth is greater than 1 and significant in column 5,
showing that wealthy entrepreneurs are more likely to
opt for formal loans to increase their access to external
finance. This finding, once again, reaffirms the impor-
tance of reducing informational asymmetries in
obtaining bank loans.
In terms of organisational characteristics, infor-
mational asymmetry reducers, such as firm size
and asset structure, are important keys that open
the doors to both forms of external finance. It is
noteworthy that the risk ratios associated with
asset structure (a proxy of collaterals) are
economically much greater than the risk ratios
associated with other factors. This finding there-
fore highlights the essential role of collaterals in
gaining access to external loans.
Finally, the risk ratio associated with distance in
column 5 is consistent with our expectation that firms
in remote areas are more likely to use informal finance.
However, the geographical difference in terms of eco-
nomic size is not remarkable.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we aim to build a theoretical framework
that explains the determinants of small firms’ financing
decisions. The determinants are classified by three
levels: individual factors, organisational factors and
contextual factors. Using this framework, we distin-
guish four types of firms: (1) firms that use no external
finance, (2) firms that use informal finance only, (3)
firms that use formal finance only and (4) firms that
use both formal and informal finance. The theoretical
framework is then empirically tested using a panel
dataset of Vietnamese small businesses.
Findings in this study suggest that a firm’s financing
strategy depends on (1) who owns the firm, (2) what the
firm has and (3) where it is located. In addition, the
Table 3 Summary of hypotheses
Hypothesis Key argument Empirical evidence
H1a Minor ethnic and female entrepreneurs are less likely to employ external finance Partially supported
H1b Minor ethnic and female entrepreneurs, when employing external finance, are more
likely to seek informal finance
Partially supported
H2a Personal social capital is positively associated with the use of external finance Supported
H2b Personal social capital is positively associated with the use of informal finance Not supported
H3a EO is positively associated with the use of external finance Partially supported
H3b EO is positively associated with the use of informal finance Not supported
H4a Organisational capital is positively associated with the use of external finance Not supported
H4b Organisational capital is positively associated with the use of formal finance Supported
H5a Local governance quality is positively associated with the use of external finance Supported
H5b Local governance quality is positively associated with the use of informal finance Supported
H6a Pro-entrepreneurship institutions are positively associated with the use of external finance Not supported
H6b Pro-entrepreneurship institutions are positively associated with the use of formal finance Supported
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results show that there is no substantial difference among
the firms that use both formal and informal financing
sources and the firms that use either one of the two
sources. However, there are marked distinctions between
firms that use no external finance and firms that do use
external finance and also between firms that use formal
finance only and firms that use informal finance only.
Specifically, we suggest that the personal back-
grounds of entrepreneurs (i.e. ethnicity and gender)
and their social capital may determine how they finance
their business ventures. Key findings reveal that entre-
preneurs with backgrounds that are perceived to be
inferior may suffer from a level of cognitive financial
constraints that may increase their preference for financ-
ing their ventures via their own internal funds. This
finding is consistent with the research on entrepreneur’s
cognitive styles, which refer to an individual’s preferred
way of gathering, processing and evaluating informa-
tion related to creativity, problem-solving and decision-
making (Dutta and Thornhill 2008; Hayes and Allinson
1998; Sadler-Smith et al. 2000). An individual’s cogni-
tive style tends to be consistent and could be represented
as a function of the individual’s personal background.
As such, the findings that Hoa ethnic (Chinesemigrants)
and female entrepreneurs are less likely to use external
finance could be regarded as evidence showing the
relevance of demand-side financial constraints in deci-
sion-making, rather than the issues conventionally iden-
tified as informational asymmetries.
This study also highlights the importance of social
capital in gaining external finance. Nguyen et al. (2006)
show that in the absence of effective market institutions
and business data, banks in Vietnam face considerable
uncertainties (rather than risks) in lending to private
businesses. Consequently, banks employ a combination
of uncertainty avoidance and reliance on trust when
lending to their business clients. Therefore, to obtain
formal loans, it is important for small businesses to garner
social capital from associating with banking officials (Du
et al. 2015). Nonetheless, by highlighting the role of
networking, we do not mean to downgrade the value of
collaterals in reducing informational asymmetries. In fact,
in the developing countries, collaterals play a larger role
than in developed ones, which might be explained by
higher levels of information asymmetry, a lower liquida-
tion payoff or less banking market competition
(Menkhoff et al. 2012). As such, over and above social
capital, collaterals are preferred by formal lenders proba-
bly because they are more cost-efficient in reducing
informational asymmetries (i.e. there is no need for cred-
itors to set up relationships with borrowers).
Concerning the association between entrepreneurial
orientation (EO) and firm financing, this paper provides
some new evidence that might expand our understand-
ing of the financing strategies of innovative firms.
Specifically, we find that entrepreneurially oriented
companies can manage to obtain formal finance even
though they might be considered riskier than their less
entrepreneurially oriented counterparts (Wu et al. 2016).
We suspect that the conventional assumption that cred-
itors view EO firms as riskier than non-EO firms may
not hold its validity in the developing countries. Indeed,
banks may regard entrepreneurial orientation as a po-
tential channel leading to growth, thus carrying the
potential to secure the borrower’s payment ability.
Future research could explore this issue in more detail,
identifying the potential mechanisms that grant innova-
tive firms increased access to formal loans.
In addition, we note some interesting evidence on the
impact of local governance quality (law enforcement
efficiency) and informal institutions (norms and values
of doing businesses) on firm financing. Improving local
governance quality may push the local informal financial
markets to operate in a transparent way so as to establish
their legitimacy. As such, firms in provinces with better
governance quality may find it relatively easy to access
informal credit. In contrast, firms in regions endowed
with pro-entrepreneurship values (i.e. they were once
exposed to capitalism) are more likely to take on formal
debt instead of relying on relationship-based finance.
This study makes contributions to the extant entre-
preneurial finance literature in several ways. First, it
moves forward from the conventional research question
of ‘what is the impact of informal finance on firm
performance?’ by proposing another angle of analysis
of firm financing and asking ‘how do firms that make
different financing decisions differ?’ While we broadly
assume that small firms are forced to use informal loans
because these are rationed by formal lenders, we do not
have a full picture of the determinants of formal/
informal financing decisions. As such, we aim to pro-
vide some insight into this issue by proposing a theoret-
ical framework of three levels of determinants: individ-
ual, organisational and contextual. In addition, we also
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argue that these factors may intertwine in both the
demand and supply sides to shape a firm’s formal/
informal financing decisions. Some firms may inten-
tionally opt for informal finance because it fits the
demand of the firms’ owners, organisational
characteristics and local contextual situations.
Informational asymmetries and market failures are
only one side of the story. Our analysis is thus well
aligned with Barslund and Tarp (2008) in arguing that
the extent of credit market rationing may be less than is
often assumed.
Second, this study shows that informal finance is not
simply a manifestation of weaknesses in the formal fi-
nancial system, but it is also a product of personal cog-
nitive resources and local institutional and market
interactions. Elston and Audretsch (2010) put forward
the theory that country-specific institutional differences
may impact on funding choices. We go further and
suggest that sub-national (local) institutional arrange-
ments may also play an essential role. This is particularly
the case in developing countries, where the formal insti-
tutional frameworks remain inchoate and underdevel-
oped. In such a situation, local authorities have substan-
tial room for reaching their own interpretations of central
laws, some of which may be attached to rent-seeking
behaviour (Nguyen et al. 2018). As Tsai (2004) puts it,
even if the supply of official credit were sufficient, credit
officers charged with the task of making loans often face
local pressures and incentives for credit distributions that
deviate from the original intentions of state authorities.
Because informal finance is a function of cognitions
and institutions, the development and liberalisation of
the formal element of the financing market do not mean
that the informal sector will be reduced. This is in line
with Steel et al. (1997) who observe that the expansion
of demand and supply in the informal markets appears
to be related more to the growth of real sector activities
than to changes in financial policies. As such, even
when the formal sector becomes perfect, the informal
sector still has a role.
This study is of an important benefit for
policymakers. Given that the informal financing section
is a real choice for some businesses, more resources
should be assigned to facilitating the performance and
improving the efficiency of this sector. With that being
said, findings in this study could act as initial indicators
when designing policies/programs that seek to regulate
the informal credit sector, given that we now know who
is more likely to be its clients, what types of businesses
are more likely to use informal finance and where this
type of financing is more popular.
Finally, this study is not without limitations that
should be acknowledged, but they also provide potential
avenues for future research. First, the generalisability of
this study may be limited because the sample was re-
stricted to Vietnamese SMEs that are exposed to
Vietnamese political and institutional conditions,
impacting on the generalisability of the findings.
Future studies, therefore, should extend the proposed
theoretical framework and re-test it in other contexts.
Second, the dataset employed in this study is based on
surveys, whichmay suffer from intrinsic response biases
(e.g. sample selection biases, sample-dependent biases)
(Wright 2015). Future research should thus re-test the
validity of our findings using a larger dataset with longer
survey periods. Finally, due to the limited information
available in the SME survey, we are mostly restricted to
the use of dummy variables in this study. As such, the
relative importance of each financing source in the
portfolio remains unknown. Future study might design
questionnaires that capture the count values of the con-
structs used in this study, which would allow a deeper
understanding of the determinants of firm formal/
informal financing decisions.
7 Conclusion
This study investigates the determinants of small busi-
nesses’ financing decisions. The determinants are clas-
sified by three levels: individual factors, organisational
factors and contextual factors. Using this framework, we
distinguish four types of firms: firms that use no external
finance, firms that use informal finance only, firms that
use formal finance only and firms that use both formal
and informal finance. Findings in this study reveal that a
firm’s financing strategy depends onwho owns the firm,
what the firm has and where it is located. In this saying,
the conventional method focusing on firm-level charac-
teristics is insufficient to draw a complete picture of firm
financing behaviours. As such, we suggest that scholars
and policymakers should employ a holistic viewpoint
when approaching the mechanisms through which small
firms organise their financing sources.
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Appendix
Table 4 Summary of hypotheses ‘a’ (whether to use external finance or not) by ‘need’ and by ‘capability’ arguments
Hypothesis SMEs’ characteristics Need Capability
Individual level
H1a Minor ethnic and female entrepreneurs Lower need Lower capability
H2a Personal social capital NA Higher capability
Organisational level
H3a Entrepreneurial orientation Higher need Higher capability
H4a Organisational capital NA Higher capability
Contextual level
H5a Local governance quality Higher need NA
H6a Pro-entrepreneurship institutions Higher need NA
Table 5 Summary of hypotheses ‘b’ (whether to formal or informal finance) by ‘need’ and by ‘capability’ arguments
Hypothesis SMEs’ characteristics Need Capability
Individual level
H1b Minor ethnic and female entrepreneurs Lower need of formal finance Lower capability to obtain formal finance
H2b Personal social capital NA Higher capability to obtain informal finance
Organisational level
H3b Entrepreneurial orientation Higher need of informal finance Higher capability of obtaining informal finance
H4b Organisational capital NA Higher capability of obtaining formal finance
Contextual level
H5b Local governance quality Higher need of informal finance NA
H6b Pro-entrepreneurship institutions Higher need of formal finance NA
Table 6 Variable definition
Variable Definition
Ethnic A categorical variable, which takes value 0 if Kinh ethnic (the largest ethnic in Vietnam), value 1 if Hoa ethnic (Chinese
migrants—the second largest ethnic in Vietnam) and value 2 if other minor ethnics
Owner gender A dummy variable, which takes value 0 for female and value 1 for male
Owner age Age of the business owners
Start-up
experience
A dummy variable, which takes value 0 if the current business is the first venture and value 1 if the current
business is not the first
Social network A count variable, indicating the number people that an entrepreneur currently has regular contact with in the following
four areas: (1) business people in the same sector; (2) business people in other sectors; (3) bank officials, including both
formal and informal creditors; and (4) politicians and civil servants
Personal wealth A categorical variable, which takes value 1 if the personal wealth of the owner declined in the last 2 years (since the last
survey), value 2 if unchanged, value 3 if increased no more than 25%, value 4 if increased by 25–50%, value 5 if
increased by 50–100% and value 6 if owner’s personal wealth increased by more than 100%
Firm size A continuous variable, which is the natural log of the number of employees
Asset structure The ratio of fixed assets over total assets, a proxy for the availability of collaterals
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